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I was awarded a Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) Grant-in-Aid to support research for 
my doctoral project which investigates how, why, and with what success the Republican party 
was able to challenge President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society agenda between 1964 and 
1968.  My nine-day visit to the RAC in Spring 2012 marked the final stop on a two month long, 
cross-country trip which included research at libraries and archives in Texas, California, 
Michigan, Virginia, District of Columbia, and finally, New York.  Before reaching the RAC I 
had thus already explored the papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson and many prominent 
Republicans including:  Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, John Tower, Gerald Ford, Melvin Laird, 
Hugh Scott, Edward Brooke, and Jacob Javits.   The bulk of my research at the RAC focused on 
the Personal Papers (RG4) of Nelson A. Rockefeller (NAR) and the NAR Gubernatorial Papers 
(RG15), while I also spent a short time with the Papers of Winthrop Rockefeller (RG9). 
  Traditionally, historians studying politics during the 1960s have centered their attention 
on the failures of liberalism and splits in the Democratic party, in addition to focusing on the 
goals of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and their pursuit of the New Frontier and the 
Great Society.  Recent scholarly approaches, however, have turned to examining the emerging 
success of conservatism and the Republicans.  In the last five years there have been important 
reassessments of the party’s behavior with regards to issues such as the Vietnam War and race, 
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while another study details the key arguments and developments within the Republican party 
throughout the decade.
1
  Nevertheless, the Republicans’ response to Johnson’s Great Society 
remains an area of considerable scholarly neglect, which is especially regrettable in light of the 
significance LBJ’s domestic initiatives posed to the United States both during and after the 
1960s.  
As recent heated debates about the debt ceiling and the role of welfare programs such as 
Medicare in Washington highlight, issues of the size of government have remained ever-present 
in American life and politics.  This debate was greatly heightened in 1964 when Johnson 
announced his intention to mobilize the federal government to help create a Great Society.  
Arguably, the long-term beneficiary of this move has been the Republican party which has won 
votes through “small government” arguments ever since, and while it is certainly true to say that 
Republicans had been employing this line of attack long before the Johnson presidency, it must 
also be accepted that it was only in the mid-1960s that this strategy gained significant traction 
with the voters.  Moreover, it is prudent to note that while demanding smaller government has 
become a successful electoral avenue, Republican presidents have failed to turn rhetoric into 
reality, as even the administration of Ronald Reagan was unable to curb government growth.  
Indeed, it is arguable that the advent of the Tea Party movement can be traced back to the 
inability of elected Republicans to fulfill promises made since the Johnson years.  
Existing historiography all too often fails to appreciate that during LBJ’s presidency 
leading Republicans—both conservative and liberal—were finding new and creative ways to 
challenge Johnson’s agenda as they attempted to move the GOP away from the image of stodgy, 
“just say no to anything” politics that had contributed to LBJ’s landslide defeat of Barry 
Goldwater in 1964.  At the same time, as historian Robert David Johnson’s recent work on the 
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1964 presidential election notes, Johnson was trying to win the support of many of these 
Republicans to establish a Great Society consensus.
2
  Certainly, LBJ had a degree of success 
with this tactic of “frontlash” as many moderate Republican voters cast their ballots for the 
Texan in the 1964 election, while also supporting his endeavors in the field of civil rights.  Yet, 
despite his best efforts there would be no Great Society consensus in the long term, as American 
politics embarked upon a critical process of polarization during the Johnson presidency that has 
worsened with the passage of time.   
The driving force of the study, and the question that will provide the structure to my  
dissertation, is to consider how the Republican party responded to the Great Society.  The 
working hypothesis is rooted in two explanations:  Firstly, as many historians have noted, 
Lyndon Johnson and his administration made the mistake of overselling his initiatives during the 
halcyon days of 1964-1965.  In retrospect, ill-advised grandiose statements about eliminating 
poverty, achieving racial harmony, and defeating Communism in Vietnam only served to 
heighten expectations which could realistically never be met.  Moreover, historian Gareth Davies 
argues that, in 1965, the administration began moving from opportunity to entitlement rhetoric 
regarding programs aimed at solving problems involving poverty and race relations, which was 
an approach to welfare that the majority of the electorate viewed as fundamentally un-
American
3.  Davies’s study however, is more concerned with the implications for the Democratic 
party and liberalism.  Accordingly, this project intends to explore the effect this oversell and 
overreach had upon the Republican party’s strategy against the Great Society.  In particular, it 
will consider how the GOP was able to manipulate the contrast between Johnson’s promising 
outlook for the administration’s War on Poverty in 1964 and 1965, with the later reality of rising 
welfare rolls, rising crime, and racially-motivated riots across the United States.                
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Secondly, following the disastrous defeat of 1964—when the Republican party was at its 
most divided since 1912—the GOP regrouped under the leadership of House Minority Leader 
Gerald R. Ford and Republican National Committee (RNC) chairman Ray Bliss to present a 
unified image to the country, despite the ideological divisions that still existed behind closed 
doors.  Choosing to attack LBJ instead of each other, the Republicans were able to provide a 
united front against the Great Society both in Congress and to the public; an approach that 
contrasted with a Democratic party whose internal divisions became ever more public over 
involvement in Vietnam and how to pursue the Great Society as the Johnson presidency 
progressed.  Furthermore, opposition to the Great Society gave the Republican party a positive 
identity with the electorate which it had not enjoyed during the 1940s and 1950s, due to the 
GOP’s persistent inability to craft an alternative to the New Deal consensus that had persisted 
throughout those decades.  The Great Society agenda however, which was arguably more 
ambitious in nature—and therefore more open to criticism—presented the GOP with an 
opportunity to be more creative in opposition.
4
 As a result, the Republican party, which had 
looked clueless and disjointed in 1964, regrouped effectively, resulting in congressional gains in 
1966 and 1968, while also electing Richard Nixon president.  The party’s dynamic opposition to 
the Great Society, which helped return an air of electability to the party, was crucial to these 
developments. 
When considering why the Republicans challenged the Johnson agenda in the manner that 
they did, much of the existing historiography is very weak, painting the Republicans as one-
dimensional, unthinking allies of conservative Southern Democrats in Congress.  However, not 
only does this view fail to appreciate the differences that existed between Southern Democrats 
and Republicans, it is also inaccurate in its portrayal of the GOP as an ideologically coherent 
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force dominated by conservatism.  Also ignored are the different, and somewhat surprising, 
challenges that conservatives made to the Johnson agenda.  Indeed, even a cursory glance at the 
responses of leading party members to the social programs of the Great Society demonstrates 
this:  Ronald Reagan, darling of the right, extolled his vision of a “Creative Society,” which 
advocated a full-frontal attack on “big government” that sought to replace state welfare with 
volunteerism; Gerald Ford, another conservative by nature, pressed for a partnership between the 
private and public sectors to help create the jobs he felt that the War on Poverty would fail to 
create; while the leading Republican liberal, Senator Jacob Javits argued that there was a need 
for a government-sponsored “Marshall Plan for the Cities.”  Furthermore, one of the key 
Republican think tanks, the Ripon Society, argued for the introduction of liberal initiatives such 
as the negative income tax and revenue sharing, ideas which the Nixon administration would 
later propose to Congress.  It may seem contradictory to note these divisions, while also stressing 
the importance of unity to the Republican challenge to the Great Society; however, it is 
important to draw a distinction between the reality of division and the image of unity.  The 
crucial point is that Republicans were exploring different ways to respond to the Great Society 
without directly confronting each other in public.  This can be due to the underlying motivation 
of many GOP leaders experiencing exasperation at having been the minority party for so long.  
As a consequence they were willing to bury any grievances they had with each other for the 
greater good of party cohesion.   
Due to the emphasis on the role of leading Republicans, it is impossible to write this 
dissertation without a thorough consideration of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller. Certainly, during 
the 1960s, there were few Republicans who had the national stature of Rockefeller, and few who 
shared his activist approach to governing. As a result, his response to the Great Society is 
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significant as it runs against the previously noted narrative which places all Republicans as 
conservative opponents of Johnson’s initiatives.  Indeed, in an interesting reveal, one of LBJ’s 
closest domestic advisers recalled that Johnson was actually hoping that Rockefeller would win 
the 1968 presidential election (and thus defeat Johnson’s vice-president, Hubert Humphrey), 
because he believed that Rockefeller would be the best man to nourish Johnson’s Great Society 
programs.
5
  Despite this belief on Johnson’s part, NAR’s personal papers reveal that by the time 
he belatedly ran for the presidency in 1968 he was disillusioned with many of LBJ’s initiatives 
regardless of the personal warmth that the two men shared.
6
  One campaign speech, contained in 
the files of Oscar Reubhausen, illustrates this disenchantment perfectly as it shows NAR  
focusing his fire on the Great Society for its preeminent role in causing inflation and engendering 
the loss of local control in government.
7
  It should be noted, however, that NAR did display 
sympathy with many of the aims of the Johnsonian agenda, in particular urban renewal and 
ending poverty in America.  As such, in a later campaign event, also contained in the 
Reubhausen files, he was willing to concede that the Great Society included some “good 
programs.”8   
Rockefeller is also of great importance to the study as a result of his symbolic place as 
the preeminent member of the GOP’s so-called “eastern establishment;” a group of liberal and 
moderate Republicans who had traditionally controlled the presidential nominating process and 
who displayed sympathy with aspects of the Great Society project. While it is true that the 
intraparty influence of these “Rockefeller Republicans” was in decline following their reaction to 
the nomination of arch-conservative Barry Goldwater in 1964—which ranged from lukewarm 
support to outright rebellion—they remained influential in Congress and on the national stage.  
Indeed, their continued power could be seen in the Republican Coordinating Committee (RCC), 
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of which Rockefeller was a member, that among other things, advocated government 
involvement in programs aimed at reducing poverty in racially tense northern cities. This type of 
recommendation was anathema however, to those who had supported Goldwater in 1964, and it 
meant NAR had little chance of achieving his party’s nomination in 1968.  Rocky’s lack of 
popularity within the GOP is acknowledged in a strategy meeting contained in the Reubhausen 
files which shows NAR’s brain trust settling on a approach of relying on national poll numbers 
to display Rockefeller’s electability and thus propel him to the nomination.  It seems therefore, 
that there was a tacit acceptance that an activist Governor of New York had no chance of 
achieving the GOP nomination based on his policy record.
9
   
Aside from providing a crucial insight into NAR’s response to the Great Society, his  
papers are also a great source of information for those interested in other leading Republican 
figures.  Due to the large and renowned research team that ‘Rocky’ assembled, detailed 
information on men such as Goldwater, Nixon, Romney, and Reagan can be found in the files of 
Reubhausen and the files of George Hinman. In addition, the files of the New York City Office 
(J1) are especially helpful in providing greater detail about NAR’s national campaigns in 1964 
and 1968.  In particular, the material on 1964 helps the researcher to understand how forcefully 
NAR attacked Goldwater for the Arizona Senator’s negative stance on the Civil Rights Act —a 
key achievement of the Great Society era. In one speech NAR goes as far as to declare that “it is 
inconceivable to me that a man [Goldwater] taking these positions could be the standard bearer 
of the Republican party for he has effectively abandoned the Republican party on the most 
fundamental issue of our time.”10  While much of the historiography of the nomination contest, 
particularly the California primary, has been devoted to the extent to which the birth of NAR’s 
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first child with Happy Rockefeller impacted on the result, it is crucial to remember that The 
Golden State bore witness to one of the defining battles for the soul of the GOP.   
While I am still in the midst of processing the thousands of digital images that I amassed 
at the RAC, it is already clear that the resources held at the Center provide my dissertation with 
an invaluable and unique insight. Accordingly, I am incredibly grateful to the Rockefeller 
Archive Center for allowing me the chance to visit Sleepy Hollow and conduct research in such a 
historically rich environment. 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author’s permission but should not be cited or quoted 
without the author’s consent.  
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Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of scholarship in the 
history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects covered in the collections at the 
Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted by researchers who have visited the 
Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the Archive Center to support their research.  
The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to represent the 
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